The Kidnapping of Mr. Heineken

Fred Heineken and his driver Doderer

Fred Heineken (left) and his driver Doderer

Coming soon is a movie called The Kidnapping of Mr. Heineken. This article comes from Tony Scotti’s book “Executive Safety and International Terrorism.”

On the evening of Nov. 9, 1983, Mr. Heineken was kidnapped as he walked toward his waiting car. As he approached his chauffeur-driven vehicle, he was overtaken by two masked men who began to force him toward a minivan parked nearby.  Mr. Heineken called to his 57- year-old driver for assistance, and the man rushed to his aid.  Witnesses reported that both men were beaten and forced into a waiting van.  A third attacker drove away with Mr. Heineken and his driver.

The van was found a short time later, approximately 1 km away, with the motor running.   The van had been reported stolen the previous July.  If the van was stolen in July and the kidnapping conducted in November, it indicates the kidnappers were planning the attack for quite a long time.

On Nov. 23, the Times of London reported that a “coded” message had been placed in the classified section of a Dutch paper by the Heineken negotiators sending “warm congratulations” to the kidnappers and inviting them to make contact “… for practical reasons.”  By this time, word had leaked that the kidnappers were demanding more than $10 million in French, West German, U.S., and Dutch currency.

To illustrate the lengths that security can go to, a magazine article in an “exclusive” report maintained that Mr. Heineken was wearing a small electronic transmitter hidden in his belt.  The device, reportedly purchased for $18,999 from an American company, was said to emit silent signals to aid in the location of kidnap victims.  The article asserted that one kidnapper unwittingly took the belt as a souvenir, and the police were able to track him in that manner.

At the outset, the Heineken people decided that a ransom would be paid.  The Heineken people were told in a recorded message to place the ransom in mail sacks and transport them in a white van with red crosses painted on the sides.  On Nov. 28, a lone driver started out in the van on a journey that would take him more than 150 miles before the money was delivered.  The kidnappers guided the driver along the route using messages left in plastic cups at various locations.  Finally, the driver was instructed by walkie-talkie to stop over a viaduct and toss the money down to a waiting truck.  After the money was delivered, police and the victims’ families waited expectantly for the release. It did not come.

THE LIBERATION OF MR. HEINEKEN

Concerned for the safety of the two men, the police followed leads that led them to a sawmill.  Early in the morning, two days after the delivery of the ransom, a 70-man police team launched an attack on the sawmill.  No one was found there. Police were about to end their search when one official noticed a lock in a rear wall of one of the corrugated-tin buildings.  The lock was forced and the police encountered a “false” wall.  When the wall was penetrated, the police found a relieved Mr. Heineken and his driver chained in separate concrete cells.

The two had spent the three weeks since their kidnapping, clad only in pajamas, in unheated cells.  Shaken, but without serious injury, the men changed into clothes that had been optimistically brought along for the occasion and, after police interviews, were happily reunited with their waiting families.

Simultaneously with the raid, police conducted a three-city sweep that resulted in the detention of more than 20 people and the recovery of a portion of the ransom.  Many of those detained were subsequently released. Much of the initial confusion resulted from the fact that many of the suspects were related by blood or marriage.

Early reports indicated that the kidnapping was planned by a “mastermind” who was joined by three principals, one of whom was the son of a former Heineken employee.  As of this date, two key players are still at large – possibly in Spain – and the bulk of the ransom has not been recovered.

West German press reports speculate that Mr. Heineken may not be the only party with a stake in the unrecovered money.  The Dec. 5 issue of Der Spiegel reported that he was insured against kidnapping by Lloyds of London.  The article that alleged the use of the hidden mini-transmitter asserted that the device was a condition of Heineken’s kidnap insurance.

While it is generally known that kidnap insurance is available (Lloyds first underwrote such policies in the wake of the Lindbergh kidnapping), it is unusual to see a report of a specific case.  Specific knowledge of the coverage is normally strictly confidential out of concern that it could encourage attacks against those insured.  In the case of corporate insured parties, the knowledge of a policy is usually restricted to a few key people and the insurers may cancel if its existence is disclosed.  The surprising Heineken revelation, if true, could be related to the known reluctance of an underwriter to renew a policy once a claim has been made.

LESSONS LEARNED

What lessons  can learn from Mr. Heineken’s unfortunate incident?  Mr. Heineken spent a considerable amount of money on equipment but failed to protect himself at all times.  This is a common phenomenon.  Many people who surround themselves with security equipment feel it will do all the work for them.  Personal security for a man who knows he is a potential target is a 24-hour-a-day job.  Terrorists look for the weak link in the security system.  With Mr. Heineken, the weak link was the area between his office and his waiting car.  During the second phase of the kidnap program, the kidnappers obviously thought this was the weak point of his security plan.

Many people are aware that they live with an element of potential danger, not shared by the average person.  This is surely the case of executives living overseas in a terrorist-rich environment.  Due to the potential danger, they invest in security hardware such as TV monitors, armored cars, fences, and guards, but they are rarely willing to follow security best practices that require them to change their patterns or make sacrifices in their personal lives.